




Advanced cryptography for privacy protection

Cases from the government field

Kristof Verslype
PhD, Smals Research




SUPPORT FOR E-GOVERNMENT



Knowhow



Development



Staffing



Infrastructure



WWW.SMALS.BE



**Innovation with
new technologies**




**Consultancy
& expertise**



**Internal & external
knowledge transfer**



**Support for
going live**



Much more is possible with cryptography

CRYPTO WORK HORSES

Symmetric encryption

Digital signatures

Public key cryptography


Hashing

Authentication

...


Known & widely applied in government context

Advanced cryptography



Potential within government context

Advanced cryptography




Potential within government context



**Oblivious
transfer**

Scenario

Investigation by Ministry of Justice of into specific citizen
Ministry needs information provided by multiple sources




Proportionality
Privacy subject towards source
Confidentiality of investigation



Scenario

Investigation by Ministry of Justice against a specific citizen
Ministry needs information provided by multiple sources



Proportionality



Privacy subject towards source



Confidentiality of investigation



**Privacy of citizen &
confidentiality investigation
towards sources**


**Proportional processing
of personal data
by ministry of justice**

Tension



Oblivious transfer - Concept



The sender provides to a receiver access to one item out of a bigger set of items. The sender does not learn which item.



Oblivious transfer - Groups

I learn that  has access to a record with SSN of the form $xx.xx.xx-xx0.89$

I want info about 67.3.23-940.89




Population: 11 400 000
Grouped according to 3 trailing digits in SSN
Average group size: 11 400 records
=> 1 out of 11 400 OT

In reality

- ▶ Millions of records, but grouped. OT applied on one group
- ▶ Legal obligation to remove irrelevant ciphertexts asap

Oblivious transfer – Implementation & performance



Computational load
at sender

256 bit security, standard laptop

	1 out of 1000 records			1 out of 10 000 records			1 out of 25 000 records		
	Receiver init $O(\log n)$	Sender encrypt $O(\log n * s)$	Receiver decrypt $O(s + \log n)$	Receiver init $O(\log n)$	Sender encrypt $O(\log n * s)$	Receiver decrypt $O(s + \log n)$	Receiver init $O(\log n)$	Sender encrypt $O(\log n * s)$	Receiver decrypt $O(s + \log n)$
20,7KB/rec.	213ms	925ms	30ms	299ms	4896ms	27ms	289ms	11544ms	37ms
103,4KB/rec	214ms	2604ms	33ms	270ms	22 146ms	36ms	282ms	54586ms	40ms

Setup

Data in-memory / Lenovo Thinkpad L570, Windows 10, Intel Core i5-6300 CPU @ 2,40Ghz, 16GB, P-521 curve, no multithreading.

Only of crypto calculations, not of storage I/O or communication

Average of 10 runs is taken

Smals Research Java implementation

- M Byali, A Patra, D Ravi, P Sarkar. *Fast and Universally-Composable Oblivious Transfer and Commitment Scheme with Adaptive Security*. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, **2017**
- C. Peikert, V. Vaikuntanathan, B. Waters. *A Framework for Efficient and Composable Oblivious Transfer*. CRYPTO 2008: Advances in Cryptology – **CRYPTO 2008** pp 554-571




Concept

- Active research domain with advanced protocols
- High efficiency
- Own Java implementation

Applicability

- Answer to a concrete need
- New technology for our sector
- Will take while to get it in production



Oblivious join

Concept by Smals Research

Fictional example

Citizen selection

- ▶ All persons self-employed as secondary activity
- ▶ With a wage above € 50 000 / year as employee

Required data

- ▶ Specific medical data &
- ▶ Data about insurance as independent


Cooperation by multiple organisations required




Joining and pseudonymizing
personal data from multiple sources
for research purposes

Joining personal data – Current practice

Example 1



Example 2



Deliberation nb.
17/071 from 19/9/17
(left)

Deliberation nb.
19/062 from 2/4/19
(right)

- Complex flow
- Bespoke
- Slow
- Security risks
- Data leakage

Context

Joining and pseudonymizing personal data from multiple sources for research purposes

Scenario

Citizen selection

- ▶ All persons self-employed as secondary activity
- ▶ With a wage above € 50 000 / year as employee


Required data

- ▶ Specific medical data
- ▶ Data about insurance as independent

Issues

- ▶ Data leakage towards senders and/or TTP
- ▶ Extra intermediaries increase complexity


Potential traditional approach



Oblivious join

Idea

- Each sender sends all potentially relevant data to the receiver, but encrypted and pseudonymized
- Receiver can decrypt iff something received about the same citizen from each sender



Receiver learns only required pseudonymized **personal** data.

Minimal leakage of **statistical data** leaks to the receiver


in example:

- #citizens with wage > € 50 000
- #independents as secondary activity


Oblivious join

TTP (Trusted third party)


- ▶ Removes asap irrelevant ciphertexts
- ▶ Potentially does additional operations (e.g. checks)
- ▶ Access control w.r.t. researcher
- ▶ 'Trust' very limited



Oblivious join



Oblivious join






Current practice Vs. Oblivious join




Deliberation nb.
17/071 from 19
September 2017

→ Oblivious join
automated
→ Analysis
→ Data transfer

Standard flow
in parallel
No data leakage



Current practice Vs. Oblivious join



Deliberation nr.
19/062 from 2
April 2019

- Oblivious join automated
- Analysis
- Data transfer

Standard flow
in parallel
No data leakage

Oblivious join

Status

- ▶ First library for test and demo purposes with core functionality
- ▶ Efficiency for 256 bit security: “A few hours” [1]
- ▶ Technical description in progress
- ▶ Collaboration with legal and security services


Joining & pseudonymizing personal data

- ▶ In a standardized way
- ▶ Without data leakage



[1] Preliminary tests on Ubuntu 18.04, Intel Core i5-8250 CPU @ 1,60Ghz, 4 cores, 6GB

Advanced cryptography



Potential within government context

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🌐 www.smals.be
www.smalsresearch.be
www.cryptov.net (personal)

Smals research sees opportunities within government context

Complex or hard to attain goals in a traditional way?

**Functional
requirements**



**Security & privacy (GDPR)
requirements**

Ongoing research