

# **Smals Research**



Innovation with new technologies



Consultancy & expertise



Internal & external knowledge transfer



Support for going live

GraphRAG

Guardrails & Evaluations for RAG

Semantic Search

Neuro-symbolic Al Agentic Al

Agent-Computer Interaction

Rules and code generation

Legacy code & Al

Native Graph ML

2025

Zero-Knowledge proofs

Verifiable
Credentials & EU
Digital Wallet

Code security assistants

Crypto migration

Crypto policy as code

Confidential cross-institutional collaboration

Knowledge Graphs

Administrative Digital Twins

Metadata Management Solutions

Dark & Deep Web



# Decathlon victime d'une fuite de

Il a ainsi injecté des informations comme des identifiants et mots de passe, qu'il a trouvées sur le dark web, dans différents systèmes de connexion dont celui de Decathlon.

# LE SOIR

Jemeppe-sur-Sambre: 1,3 billion de données volées à la Commune Si la rançon de 700 000 € n'est pas payée, les cybercriminels publieront une partie des données volées ce jeudi, à 2h du matin, sur le l'avenir dark web

# Hackers publiceren gegevens na cyberaanval in Geraardsbergen

Die software versleutelt informatie en vraagt de eigenaar om losgeld te betalen. Dat is niet gebeurd, zegt het lokaal bestuur, en de gegevens zijn vandaag gepubliceerd op het

De Standaard

#### Des milliers de boîtes mail professionnelles belges sans défense Les données de login de nombre de boîtes mail professionnelles (...) sont en vente (...) le 'dark web' (...) 33.568 adresses e-mail de départements financiers: 83 pour cent d'entre elles avec des mots de passe. **DataNews**

### WhatsAppgegevens van 3,2 miljoen Belgen te koop op dark web Op een forum op het dark web zijn telefoonnummers en gebruikersnamen te koop

### Démembrement de la plus vaste plate-forme au monde dans le web clandestin

Les autorités allemandes ont mis fin au plus grand marché installé dans ce qu'on appelle le DataNevvs

La FWA victime de cyber-criminels qui pensaient s'en prendre au SPW

Sur le dark web, 8Base revendique pour sa part huit nouvelles victimes, dont le Service public de Wallonie



Une affaire de pédocriminalité LaLibre

interpellé par la police néerlandaise après que horrifie un village des vidéos de la fillette ont été retrouvées sur le Darknet

Politie waarschuwt voor valse bankmedewerkers: "Cijfers gaan elk jaar de hoogte in"

"Mensen hebben vertrouwen omdat bankmedewerkers alles weten", vertelt de hoofdinspecteur. "Die gegevens verkrijgen ze echter via het dark web." Het Nieuwsblad



### The dark web iceberg

#### Clear web / Surface web

Part of the web accessible with a browser, indexed by traditional search engines Examples: www.smals.be, www.rtbf.be, www.belgium.be, www.wikipedia.org...

Disclaimer: questionable distribution!

#### Deep web

Non-indexed part of web. Accessible with a traditional browser + address or credentials Examples: Mails, Sharepoints...

#### Dark web

Part of web requiring specific tools (browser + network)

Examples: **Tor** (The Onion Router), 12P,

Hyphanet...

**Dark Web** 

**Iceberg** 

**Surface Web** 

**Deep Web** 

not accessible

with traditional search engines

**Dark Web** 

unsearchable, encrypted, private

**5**%



was Tor created

### How

does Tor work

Technical part 😂

What's in there

# Who's

active

Business part





was Tor created

- What to protect?
- How to protect?
- Is that enough?

What's in there

### How

does Tor work

Who's

active





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does Tor work

**Vho**'s

active



- Hacker
- Relatives/colleagues...
- (Foreign) Law Enf.



### **Anonymity vs privacy**





- Identity (post or mail address, phone n°, id...)
- IP address
- Localisation
- ISP
- Try to hide?




### **Privacy**: protect what you do

- Message content
- Visited servers (IP or domain name)
- Browsing history:
  - Current session or past
  - This website or other





### **Client IP address**



#### IP address is:

- Shared
- Dynamic
- Not itinerant resistant

Information for website: (very) approximative location

→ Very limited

But: with IP + timestamp, ISP/Law Enf. can find "you"!






### **Cookies**

GET /page1.html






#### Cookies:

- Inoffensive/passive (text) file
- Do not (usually) contain history, but Ids and preferences
- Unreadable by other websites
- Unreadable by intermediates (modem, ISP...) if HTTPS
- Allow to keep the session alive between clicks
- But allow to link successive sessions
- ...and help websites to 'profile' visitors





### Third party cookies



#### Third party cookies:

- Not readable by main site (and vice-versa)
- Facebook cookie: same as on facebook.com (even if logged off!)
- Allow to track visitors on other sites with the same snippet
- (Almost) no added value for visitors

#### Good news:


- Easy to disable (with almost no effect)
- Blocked by Firefox or Edge... but not (yet) by Chrome
- Good plugins available (Ghostery...)





### **Fingerprinting**

Goal: Bypass cookies decline - Method: Collect (with JavaScript) as many details to build a "fingerprint"



Yes! You are unique among the 4108223 fingerprints in our entire dataset.





### **Local traces**

- Many traces about activity on a computer
  - Browsing history
  - Cookies' content
  - Cache
  - Downloads
  - Record Name . . . . : www.smalsresearch.be
    Record Type . . . . : 1
    Time To Live . . . : 35421
    Data Length . . . . : 4
    Section . . . . : Answer
    A (Host) Record . . : 185.22.109.12

PS C:\Users\vab> ipconfig /displaydns

Windows IP Configuration

www.smalsresearch.be

Can be sensitive if computer is seized, lost, hacked



### Who can see what?

	ISP/Access point *	Website	Trackers	Other users
IP Client	User identity (if registered)	Approx geo	Approx geo	/
IP Destination	Website: sometimes Page: never	(na)	(na)	
Main cookies	/	Visitor tracking (on current website)	/	Activity history
3 <sup>th</sup> party cookies	/	/	Visitor tracking (on all sites using the same tracker)	/
Fingerprinting	(na)	Visitor tracking (on current website)	Visitor tracking (on all sites using the same tracker)	/
Local traces	(na)	(na)	(na)	Activity history

<sup>\*</sup> Assuming HTTPS





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active



### **HTTPS**

- Almost unavoidable on modern browsers
- End-to-end encryption browser ← → web server


https://www.s

- Encrypt:
  - Content
  - HTTP headers
  - Cookies
  - URL (Domain name + path) → But DNS request was needed!
- Do not encrypt IP address (source/target)

		ISP/Access point	Website	Trackers	Other users
	Anonymity	/	/	/	/
•	Privacy	No access to content Limited domain knowledge	/	/	/



### **Private browsing**








End of session: delete all cookies

Block 3<sup>th</sup> party cookies



Delete cache, form data, browsing history






#### Do not:

- Mask IP address
- Impact ISP
- Impact some local traces (DNS cache...)
- Delete downloads





### Virtual Private Network (VPN)



ISP: destination IP

#### Encrypt:

- Content
- HTTP headers
- Cookies
- URL

Same as HTTPS!

Target server: source IP (geo)



### Virtual Private Network (VPN)

- VPN usage: mainly a trust shift from ISP to VPN
- Useful if:
  - Untrustworthy ISP (abroad, public access point)
  - Need to bypass service or geo-blocking
  - In a corporate context
- Does not prevent HTTPS
- Does not block cookies

		ISP/Access point	Website	Trackers	Other users
	Anonymity	Can detect VPN usage	No access to IP or geo	No access to IP or geo	/
	Privacy	No more access to visited websites/services	/	/	/





was Tor created

- What to protect?
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What's in there

### How

does Tor work

 $\mathsf{Who}_{\mathsf{S}}$ 

active



### Is that enough?

- Have to trust someone (ISP/access point or VPN)
- With help of ISP or VPN, Law Enforcement can find a server or a user based on IP address & timestamp
- A lot of people need stronger protection:





Dissidents
Activists
Whistleblowers



**Travellers** 



Smals ICT for society



was Tor created

What's in there

### How

does Tor work

- Components
- Onion pealing
- Hidden services
- Tails

 $\mathsf{Who}_{\mathsf{S}}$ 

active




### Tor: 3 components

**Tor Network**: +/- 8000 volunteer nodes acting as relays

Tor browser (Firefox clone): do not keep any trace (cache, history, cookies, downloads, DNS...), limit JavaScript

New Tor circuit for this site Your guard node may not change . . .



Dark web: web content



by juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazcldy2hlmovfu2epvl5ankdibsot4csyd.

Onion/Hidden services:

« dark web servers »

**Connection to a dark site** 

Connection to a clear site

Circuit for juhanu...t4csyd.onion

Netherlands (guard) 185.157.120.51

Germany 178.254.20.235


France 45.13.119.200, 2a10:4640:0:ff03::1

Tor Circuit


This browser

Onion site relays


juhanu...t4csyd.onion

















### Tor: Hidden service



- Hidden service/Onion service: allow (web) server to hide as much as client
- Both client and server choose 3 relays and meet at a « rendezvous » point

Onion service URL: http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazcldy2hlmovfu2epvl5ankdibsot4csyd.onion




### **Preventing fingerprinting**

Attribute spoofing



	Chrome 🧿	Tor D	
User agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/138.0.0.0 Safari/537.36	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; Win64; x64) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0	
Timezone	UTC+02:00	UTC-00:00	
Content language	en,en-US;q=0.9,fr-FR;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7,nl;q=0.6	en-US,en;q=0.5	
Screen resolution	1536 x 864	1400 x 800 (letterboxing 200 x 100)	
List of fonts	Agency FB, Algerian, Arial, Arial Black, Arial Narrow, And 158 others	Arial, Arimo, Courier, Courier New, Helvetica, <b>And 27 others</b>	
Canvas	Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz,		

→ Goal: making all Tor users look alike





### **Tails**



- Tor weakness: OS it runs on!
- Cannot control OS traces indices that/when Tor ran might be easy to find
- Tails (<a href="https://tails.net">https://tails.net</a>) = Live OS, on a USB stick:
  - Can boot on (almost) any computer
  - No trace on that computer (main OS is not started, HD is not used)
  - No trace on the USB stick
  - Optional « persistent storage »

		ISP/Access point	Website	Trackers	Other users
	Anonymity	Can detect Tor usage (unless bridge)	Can detect Tor No access to IP or geo	No access to IP or geo	Not any trace on computer
•	Privacy	No access to visited website/services	No access to history between sessions	No access to history	No access to history





### Who can see what with Tails?

	ISP/Access point *	Website	Trackers	Other users
IP Client	User identity (if registered)	Approx geo	Approx geo	/
IP Destination	Website: sometimes Page: never	(na)	(na)	
Main cookies	/	Visitor tracking (on current website)	/	Activity history
3 <sup>th</sup> party cookies	/	/	Visitor tracking (on all sites using the same tracker)	/
Fingerprinting	(na)	Visitor tracking (on current website)	Visitor tracking (on all sites using the same tracker)	/
Local traces	(na)	(na)	(na)	Activity history

<sup>\*</sup> Assuming HTTPS



### Required precaution

#### To stay anonymous, Tor users have to compartmentalise their online live!

- No email/bank account/phone number/... linkable to a real identity
- No payment with a identifiable card → use Bitcoin, Monero...
- Delete metadata before sharing files
- Never go to same service without using Tor

#### Bomb alert at Harvard, 2013

- Author used a mail service (Guerilla Mail) from Tor (Tor output relay IP in the mail header)
- He was the only one connected to Tor (input relay) from the campus Wi-Fi!

#### Silk road founder (Ross W. Ulbricht, 2011-2013)

- Mentioned once « rossulbricht@gmail.com » on a crypto-money forum with « Altoid » pseudo
- Same pseudo was used on another DW forum, linked by FBI as a Silk Road





was Tor created

### How

does it work

### What's

in there

- Entry points
- Markets
- Forums
- Leaks
- Activism

### $\mathsf{Who}_{\mathsf{s}}$


active



### Tor: uncomfortable user experience



Yery high turn-over, dead links are everywhere



Suspicion is the norm!

- Captcha very difficult to solve
- Queue to protect from DDoS
- Very slow (relays, encryption...)
- Most content is criminal (>< Initial goal: help to fight censorship)
- BUT: no technical skills needed!










### Tor: uncomfortable user experience















### **Entry points**

#### Hidden wiki

List of links ("clear" or "dark web")




# Search engines Torch, Ahmia, Haystack...




thehidden2.wiki, thehidden-wiki.org, thehiddenwiki.org...



### **Markets**




### **Markets**



45 EUR = 0.00049 B X Buy now




### **Markets**



**Smals ICT** for society

### **Forums**








# Data leaks (credentials)

250,400,000	MANUSCAN GEORGE STATE	6207
terena	.com:Adip	<u>@</u>
simono	L.fr:Mago	
major	₃il.com:C	
salam.	otmail.co	1@*
alial:	ok.com:Al	
ghenav	L@outlook	ova
houss€	<pre>c.com:Hal</pre>	
florer	L.com:Rob	
mark1:	:om:xs.Ma	
jahmaı	Devilrays	
star.(	L.co.uk:W	
iem_l·	₃llstadt.	ein
birig:	∂@mv-hall	sikve
sshhoc	no-barbin	8
darsi	nempata.c	g123
sandra	5@mv-hall	sikve
huaice	veiwoduzu	



### Data leaks (full dumps)

- Ransomware: if ransom not paid → data published on Dark Web for free!
- Thousands of « full dumps » available on ransomware groups hidden websites
- Examples: listings (names, birthdates, phones, emails, payments...), factory plans, confidential contracts, DB content, HR docs, Ids...

> 50 public agencies (abroad)

Iraq, China, Thailand, Tonga, Vietnam, Indonesia, Ukraine, S. Korea, USA, Israel, France... ~ Some public Belgian agencies

SPW, Geraardsbergen, Jemeppe-sur-Sambre, FRS-FNRS, limburg.net, Maldegem

→ Offline



~ 110 private Belgian companies


Schools, IT, Pharma, Health, Bank, Insurance, Logistics...

→ Some still online





# Data leaks (health example)






# Data leaks (health example)


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NO	1	NAAM	▼VOORNAAM	▼ GEBDAT TI ADRES	▼GEMEENTE	▼ POST TELPRIVE	▼ GSM	▼ EMAIL	▼ SALD ▼ OPMERK
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9	289243	(1775). May		1 M	3			Egineral Security Security	D Eliquis-bisoprolol-simvastatine-Fosamax-pantaprazol
30	289244			2 M	L Roberts Combane				0 Methadone 70 mg
31	289245			1 M	3			Bernard Barrier on	0 Asaflow
32	289246			M	CAPE DE PARE	T			-982 Pacemaker 12/2021
33	289247		0.000	1 M .	Charles St. St. St. St. St. St. Land St	T			0 dentalia
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2	289276			M	-	-			0 DENTALIA
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4	289278	MODERAL		M		+ + -		_	0 2-3 pontage et valve biologique-Asaflow-glucophage-nova
55	289279		1000						0 Asaflow
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**ICT** for society

# **Authorities/Whistleblowing**












### Media










### **Activism**













Why

was Tor created

How

does it work

What's in there

Who's

active



### Who's active in Belgium

#### Sciensano (2020)

[N]ous analysons les risques engendrés par les nouvelles drogues (...) disponibles via Internet et le dark web. L'idée consiste (...) à acheter et analyser des échantillons.

#### SPF Finance (2019)

Des spécialistes en cybercriminalité (...) recherche des auteurs de crimes informatiques, tant sur le Web que sur le Dark Web

#### **Myria (Federal Migration Center, 2023)**

Pour détecter les cas de traite des êtres humains (...) les États membres ont mis en place (...) la surveillance d'internet (à la fois le web visible et le dark web)

#### **AFMPS (2025)**

Les réseaux sociaux et les marchés en ligne, tant sur l'internet que sur le dark web, continuent de jouer un rôle central dans le trafic de médicaments contrefaits.

#### SPF Finance (2017)

CDC « Cyber Intelligence Feeds »: l'analyse automatisées d'informations de sources ouvertes (dark web (...) compris)

#### **Bpost (2020)**

Le lancement d'un suivi proactif (...) de l'Internet (réseau public, deep web et dark web) afin de recevoir (...) des signaux sur les (...) attaques qui se préparent.

#### SPF Justice (2016)

Le dark web permet aussi à ses utilisateurs de (...) diffuser à grande échelle du matériel pédopornographique (...) et du matériel lié à l'exploitation sexuelle des enfants (...)

La vente de drogues via internet a augmenté. Des 491 sites (...) sur le 'darknet', 98% vendaient des drogues illicites.


#### SPF Santé publique (2024)

La valeur des données médicales serait (...) 10 à 20 fois plus élevée sur le dark web que les données financières. Plusieurs hôpitaux belges ont été victimes de cyberattaques ces derniers mois.

#### Police/FCCU (2017)

Nous sommes à l'affût des dernières tendances et des menaces (...). Le dark web en est un bon exemple, tout comme le hacking et les logiciels de type ransomware.







# CCB/CERT



- At CCB, CERT (Cyber Emergency Response Team) actively monitors dark web (including creds/data leaks)
- To do ASAP:
- → Register (and update!) your org on <a href="https://atwork.safeonweb.be">https://atwork.safeonweb.be</a>

When a threat is detected:

- → CCB contacts victim, and provides support (tech/admin)
- If you detect any (cyber) incident:
- → Report on <a href="https://notif.safeonweb.be">https://notif.safeonweb.be</a>

- CCB won't:
  - Start any legal proceeding
  - Investigate/identify criminals
- → Contact police!



### Police/FCCU





- Federal Computer Crime Unit
- Federal Police
  - Federal Judicial Police
    - DJSOC (Direction centrale de la lutte contre la criminalité grave et organisée / Centrale directie van de bestrijding van de zware en georganiseerde criminaliteit)
      - > FCCU
- Missions:
  - Investigation about critical infrastructures attacks
  - IT Support for other DJSO units
  - Contact point for Europol



### Should I go to Dark Web?

**C**-Dark Web 9 Should







Excel File

### **Legal comments**

- Going to Dark Web/using Tor → Legal! (in Belgium)
- Buying illegal products/data → Illegal!
- No intention = No crime! Cannot commit an offence « by accident »
- Civil servants obliged to report offences
- Legal framework:
  - Investigation mandate?
  - Permission to create fake profile?
  - Permission to buy illegal products?



# **Threat or Opportunity?**



- Credential leaks
- Full dump leaks
- Hacking tools



- Monitoring Market:
  - Drugs
  - Medicines
  - Counterfeit items, documents, money
- Fighting pedopornography/human trafficking
- Whistleblowing secure drop
- Securing exchanges with threatened partners



### **Conclusion (as a threat)**

- Risk is high to be leaked
- Prepare your org!
- Don't stay alone! Contact CCB/FCCU
- Once it's there, it's forever...



### Conclusion (as an opportunity)

- Tor is not only an hacker tool, Dark web is not only a crime zone!
- Several public services monitor it, but further exploration is possible
- Not difficult to go to Dark web, but poor UX
- Part of Dark web is even more hidden and can only be accessed « by trust »
- First exploration at very low cost: decommissioned machine, internet access (outside org network!!) ... no software cost, only a few hours of manpower!



### Management summary (1/2)

- Dark Web: part of the web requiring special software
- Tor: Browser + Network, by far the main « dark web/dark net »
- Onion service/Hidden service: « Dark website », only reachable using Tor browser
- No way to shutdown Tor network; Almost impossible to find client or server IP/Owner
- Tor browser can be used to navigate on normal website, with a high level of anonymity
- Originally, Tor was build to protect citizens again censorship/repression in authoritarian regimes
- Today, most of its content seems to be illegal
- Most problematic content:
  - Drugs, Medicines
  - Hacking (credentials, tools)
  - Counterfeit items, documents, money
  - Pedopornography
  - Data leaks (phishing/ransomware result)



### Management summary (2/2)

- Some public services already use/monitor Dark Web, but there is room for evolution
- What should public service do:
  - Consider if they should monitor some specific markets
  - Search for credential leaks from their members
  - If they are a ransomware victim, search for their data leaks
- Contact CCB/FCCU for support in case of incident/data leaks
- What Smals can further offer:
  - Ad hoc webinar, Tor tutorial/workshop: yes
  - First introduction to content for a specific field: depends
  - Help to buy monitoring solution: to be discussed
  - Monitoring, recovery in case of hacking, data deletion: no (→ CCB)



