

Smals Research 2020









NewSQL Databases

Anomalies & Transaction Management

Conversational Interfaces

Near-real-time Translation Web Scraping for Analytics

GIS for Analytics

Augmented Reality Graph Analytics
Visualisation

2020

Al Cases & Deployment

Robotic Process

Automation

Crypto Cases

European Blockchain Infrastructure


Knowledge Graphs Advanced Cryptography

Quantum
Computing &
Cryptography

FIDO2 / Web Authentication



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What could possibly go wrong?

Screwing up your own Al

Someone screws with your Al



Someone's AI screws with you

Unscrewing things

For AI developers: from data to decision

Data collection issues (bias vs. fairness)
Data processing issues (confounding variables)
Goal (mis)formulation

For AI deployers

Data poisoning Adversarial examples

General public

Spear phishing (personalized) disinformation The role of recommender systems

Defense against the Dark Arts

Transparency & explainability Digital Skepticism Policy




- Al systems are trained on data
 - → Garbage in, garbage out

- Training data is ideally
 independent and identically distributed (iid) over the domain
 = well-balanced & free from hidden correlations
- In reality, this is rarely the case How many men named Anna do you know?



Limits on data → limits on results

June 2020: Face Depixelizer (generates a face that fits a pixelated image)



- Training dataset (Flickr-Faces-HQ) contains less people of color / elderly
- Used method (StyleGAN) overvalues "average" → leans towards young whites
- Q: Would we detect less visible biases too, e.g. in mortgage applications?




Al inherits biases from its creators

- Biased humans → biased data
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of cognitive biases
- Biased data → biased AI systems
 - Curse of dimensionality: impossible to cover every combination of every parameter



Hidden correlations

- We'll fix it by not taking protected characteristics into account, right?
- ... well...
 - Men/women have different ways of speaking



- In CVs, men/women mention different things (hobbies...)
 - → Gender as prominent confounding factor in Amazon's HR experiment




male

ight win fighting

Confounding factors

- Definition: hidden property influencing known properties and outcomes
- Sometimes leads to surprising new insights!

Blood Meridian (Cormac McCarthy)




Absalom, Absalom (William Faulkner)

- → Al does not necessarily learn what you want it to learn!
- Mitigations:
 - Better sampling of the training data
 - Thorough (statistical) data analysis



Fairness

- Not all bias is unfair:
 - Prostate cancer data is biased towards men
 - Cervix cancer data is biased towards women
- Unfair bias can have serious consequences
 - Security decisions (airport controls / inspections)
 - Legal decisions (bail, parole)
 - Economic decisions (insurance, mortgage)
- Tools exist to help spot unfair bias
 - http://aiblindspot.media.mit.edu/
 - https://data-en-maatschappij.ai/en/tools
- → Know your data, your algorithms, and their limitations





Definition of objectives

- AI/ML algorithms optimize, i.e. minimize a loss or maximize a reward
 - reward "success"
 - punish "failure"
- "Success" can be hard to define
 - Engineers (over)simplify the goals
 - Additional conditions may be forgotten
- Al follows the specs but may
 - exploit bugs or unexpected data properties
 - get stuck in endless loops



I hooked a neural network up to my Roomba. I wanted it to learn to navigate without bumping into things, so I set up a reward scheme to encourage speed and discourage hitting the bumper sensors.

It learnt to drive backwards, because there are no bumpers on the back.

Source: Twitter / @Smingleigh

(For more examples, see this spreadsheet)



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For Al deployers: attacks against Al systems
 Data poisoning
 Adversarial examples

General public

Spear phishing (personalized) disinformation The role of recommender systems

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 Digital Skepticism
 Policy



Data poisoning

- Inject false training data to compromise learning
 - Intentionally mislabeled data
 - Bogus data or noise
- Crowdsourcing risks
 - Individual jokers
 - Coordinated attacks (Twitter/4chan/reddit mobs)
- Webscraping risks
 - Wiki vandalism
 - Inclusion of shady websites
- → Data verification is not a luxury!



Source: <u>Twitter / @iambomanix</u>

Nearly Half of Scottish Wikipedia is Incorrectly Written by a US Teen


By Ryan Lappe on 1st September 2020

Source: trillmag.com



Adversarial examples

Minimal change to input → large change in output



"it was the best of times, it was the worst of times"


+

* 0.001

-

"it is a truth universally acknowledged that a single"

Source: Nicolas Carlini & David Wagner, <u>"Audio Adversarial</u> Examples: targeted attacks on speech-to-text"





Adversarial examples

- Problem in most AI methods, regardless of data format
- Often robust
 - Change of a few pixels
 - Stickers on objects
 - 2D/3D printed objects
- Contributing factors
 - Curse of dimensionality
 - Overfitting / Limited generalization
 - Adding one strong feature from another class is enough



Source: bair.berkeley.edu / Ivan Evtimov, Kevin Eykholt, Earlence Fernandes, Bo Li et al., <u>"Physical Adversarial</u> Examples Against Deep Neural Networks"



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General public: Abuse of Al systems

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
Spear / laser phishing

 Fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information, directed at a specific individual/company

Webscraping + AI may be deployed to personalize messages to

many targets → "laser phishing"








Fake websites / fake people

- Fake websites
 - Scams
 - Phishing
 - Pyramid schemes
 - •
- Fake profiles
 - Impersonations, "CEO fraud"
 - Creation of "bot armies"
 - Sales / product review fraud
 - Social media surveillance
 - Influencing

•



Source: LinkedIn / Aurélie Jean

Disinformation ("fake news")

- **Definition** (EC action plan against disinformation, 05/12/2018):
 - Verifiably false or misleading information
 - Disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive
 - May cause public harm

Source: bellingcat.com / Robert Evans, "How Coronavirus Disinformation Gets Past Social Media Moderators"



- It is not:
 - (Extreme) political, scientific, ethical or moral viewpoints
 - Unions, lobbying, advocacy, campaigning, ...
 - Selective presentation of information
 - Satire, parody, ...
 - Religion



Can disinformation be generated?

Image/video/audio: yes, kind of











2017

cf. deepfakes:



Source: Twitter / @ousathesquid

Source: Twitter / @goodfellow ian



• From *The Verge*:

OPENAI'S NEW MULTITALENTED AI WRITES, TRANSLATES, AND SLANDERS

A step forward in AI text-generation that also spells trouble

By James Vincent | Feb 14, 2019, 12:00pm EST

In *The Verge*'s own tests, when given a prompt like "Jews control the media," GPT-2 wrote: "They control the universities. They control the world economy. How is this done? Through various mechanisms that are well documented in the book *The Jews in Power* by Joseph Goebbels, the Hitler Youth and other key members of the Nazi Party."

• "We have the technology to totally fill Twitter, email, and the web up with reasonable-sounding, context-appropriate prose, which would drown out all other speech and be impossible to filter." (Jeremy Howard, Fast.AI)



Generating Fake Text

- State-of-the-art GPT-3 (05/06/2020) generates more than prose
 - Code
 - Layouts
 - Translations
 - Basic reasoning
 - •

```
What is the average number of influencers each user is subscribed to?

1    SELECT
2    avg(count)
3    FROM
4    (
5     SELECT
6         user_id,
7         count(*)
8    FROM
9         subscribers
10    GROUP BY
11         user_id
12    ) as avg_subscriptions_per_user
```

Source: Twitter / @FaraazNishtar

- Training cost: ± \$4.000.000 (on external cloud service)
- Not perfect, nor "intelligent":

Q: How many eyes does a horse have?

A: 4. It has two eyes on the outside and two eyes on the inside.



Source: Twitter / @sharifshameem



Amplification through recommendation

- YouTube as the great radicalizer (Z. Tufekci)
 - Videos about vegetarianism lead to veganism
 - Videos about jogging lead to ultramarathons

Source: cnet.com

SCITTECH

YouTube to blame for rise in flat Earth believers, says study

According to research almost everyone who believes in flat Earth theory got started on YouTube.

BY MARK SERRELS | FEBRUARY 17, 2019 8:05 PM PST



Source: Twitter / @chrislhayes

Similar on many other (free) platforms with recommendation systems: Instagram, TikTok, tabloid websites etc.

Amplification through recommendation

- Consumer objective ≠ producer objective
 - You: want to find good information
 - Social media: wants you to keep watching (ads)
 - Promotes content that "pushes buttons"
 - → Conspiracy theories, sensationalism, disturbing content, extremism, ...
- The recommendation feedback loop

Inflammatory Any content that is watched more obtains a higher ranking in search results

Source: The Verge

YouTube says it will recommend fewer videos about conspiracy theories

Taking steps to reduce the spread of misinformation

71.1

-- is this enough?



Societal impact

Echo chambers

- By default, you're mostly served pre-selected information
 - Who does the selection?
 - With what objective?
- Mainstreaming of extreme content
- Eroding trust, proliferation of conspiracy theories (e.g. QAnon)
- National politics, e.g. US 2016 election:
 - Search "Trump" → 81% of "up next" recommended videos is pro-Trump
 - Search "Clinton" → 88% of "up next" recommended videos is pro-Trump

(Source: Guillaume Chaslot, "YouTube's A.I. was divisive in the US presidential election"

- International politics: information warfare
 - e.g. Russian reporting on MH17, Ukraine crisis, Crimea etc.



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


As a technical person

- Governance through FATE (sometimes FEAT)
 - Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, Ethics
- Guidelines and technical tools
 - https://ethical.institute/principles.html
 - Lime
 - IBM AI Fairness 360
 - Microsoft Fairlearn
 - Google Fairness-gym
 - •
- Explainable Al
 - Important factor in accountability
 - Especially hard with deep learning
 - Still in its infancy

ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAccT)

A computer science conference with a cross-disciplinary focus that brings together researchers and practitioners interested in fairness, accountability, and transparency in socio-technical systems.





As a citizen

- Awareness
 - You are being profiled
 - What you see is not what someone else sees
 - Anything you post can be used against you
 - Technology and law keeps evolving
- Rely on authoritative, transparent sources
 - Peer-reviewed science
 - Quality journalism



Difficult questions that arise in practice:

- Does Facebook have the right to make these analyses?
- Can Facebook share the result with law enforcement, even "for your own good"?
- Consent? Privacy?
- What with faulty predictions?
- → Encourage Digital Skepticism (without being paranoid)
- → Requires some Competences / Literacy



As a policymaker

Awareness

- Own vulnerability to pre-selected information
- Advertisement-revenue driven recommendation feedback loop leads to online over-representation of extremes
- Information warfare

Stimulate

- Independent and quality media
- Innovation & research on the impact of innovation
- Culture of permanent learning



Initiatives

- https://data-en-maatschappij.ai/
- https://www.ai-cursus.be/
- https://www.knack.be/nieuws/factchecker/
- https://www.vrt.be/nl/vrtonderwijs/edubox/





- https://faky.be/fr
- https://openfacto.fr/
- https://www.reseauia.be/
- https://www.ai4belgium.be/









GDPR (ratified in Belgium: law of 30 July 2018)

Article 22

Automated individual decision-making, including profiling

- 1. The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.
- 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the decision:
- (a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller;
- (b) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests; or
- (c) is based on the data subject's explicit consent.
- 3. In the cases referred to in points (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision.
- 4. Decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be based on special categories of personal data referred to in Article 9(1), unless point (a) or (g) of Article 9(2) applies and suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in place.



On the EU level

- 03/2015: Stratcom Task Force → <u>euvsdisinfo.eu</u>
- 10/2018: EU code of practice on disinformation
 - Signed by Google, Facebook, Twitter, Mozilla etc.
 - (Initial) choice for industry self-regulation
- 12/2018: EU action plan on disinformation

- 04/2019: EU HLEG <u>Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI</u>
 - 07/2020: addition of <u>Assessment list for Trustworthy Al</u>
 - Belgian coordination: <u>Al4Belgium</u>



Further reading

Reports


- The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation ("Malicious Al report", 02/2018)
- For a Meaningful Artificial Intelligence ("Villani report", 03/2018)
- Information Manipulation, A Challenge for Our Democracies (CAPS & IRSEM, France, 08/2018)
- Artificial Intelligence Primer (OECD OPSI, 28/11/2019)

Organizations and Academia


- https://montrealethics.ai/
- https://cyber.harvard.edu/ / https://ai.shorensteincenter.org/
- https://www.turing.ac.uk/research/data-ethics
- https://hai.stanford.edu/
- ...



Epilogue







Thank you!

Joachim Ganseman joachim.ganseman@smals.be

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Have a good idea for a research project or proof-of-concept?
research@smals.be

